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ABSTRACT
The financial world has been in uproar over news that Greece used
sophisticated financial products and Lehman Brothers used accounting
tricks to mask the extent of their financial obligations. One explanation
for this behavior lies with what I call "the ethic of technical compli-
ance." This ethic poses enormous regulatory challenges, forcing the
rule maker to get the text of the law "just right" because adherents of
this ethic are implicitly subscribers to a deconstructionist theory of
interpretation according to which all we have is the text of the law. A
Derridean stance provides a principled basis for bankers to ignore the
apparent intent behind rules because chasing authorial intent is chasing
1. William H. Widen is a Professor at the University of Miami School of Law in Coral
Gables, Florida. Professor Widen practiced corporate law and structured finance on Wall Street
for seventeen years at Cravath, Swaine & Moore in New York City before he left his partnership
at the Firm in 2002 to pursue an academic career. In particular, he participated in the development
of the derivatives business as counsel to investment banks and ISDA in the 1980s. He also
represented issuers and guarantors of structured finance products, including securitization
transactions, CBOs, CLOs, and CDOs.
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a chimera. The essay argues that business ethics has become sentential
and external rather than a function of an inner moral experience.
This essay then explores the conditions that allow Wall Street to
arbitrage truth in this way. Ironically, part of the answer lies with a
transformation of the notions of truth and falsity from their original
Greek meanings (recounted by Heidegger). The Greek word for truth is
alethea-sometimes translated as "unconcealedness." Truth is that
which is unveiled. The Greek word for false is pseudo. However, pseudo
does not simply mean "concealed" as the counter to "unveiling." It can
mean an appearance that is dissembling. The nuance is lost in our cur-
rent conception of the 'false" because we ground falsity in misstate-
ments and omissions. As illustration, contrast a name assumed by an
imposter with a "pseudonym"-a false name used by an author. An
imposter assumes a name falsely-a classic misstatement because the
name does not refer to the person who uses it. In contrast, the pseudo-
nym intentionally conceals the author without misstatement because it
correctly refers to the author while simultaneously concealing his iden-
tity. This idea of simultaneous disclosure and concealment lies at the
core of much financial engineering that our regulatory scheme has diffi-
culty combatting.
Applied to Greece, labeling a financial obligation as a derivative
allowed a transaction to proceed under a pseudonym; its purpose was
concealment without misstatement. The difficult legislative challenge is
to design systems of rules in which we can again, like the ancient
Greeks, properly label such behavior as 'false." The current debate
over rules-versus standards-based systems of disclosure ignores this
insight at its peril.
The essay concludes by suggesting that an antidote for the ethic of
technical compliance is to rethink our approach to definition of the type
of 'financial obligation" that requires disclosure. This essay explains
why it might be prudent to invert the definition of financial obligation
not by reference to transaction structure but instead by reference to the
source of the financial product-Wall Street itself-a strategy that
strengthens a general standards-based approach to disclosure and takes
away the ability to arbitrage truth.
I. INTRODUCTION
The legal system-his voice was extremely loud-is corrupt. It has
nothing to do with truth! So I ask him-I was trying to keep my
voice as composed as I could-what is truth. He laughs at me. He
stands right there and laughs at me! 'Who are you,' he says, 'Pontius
Pilate?'
-LAWRENCE JOSEPH, LAWYERLAND 72 (1997)
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Our financial system has descended into crisis. This crisis has its
origins in the relationship between people and the texts of laws, regula-
tions and contracts they write to govern their lives. In short, it is the
thesis of this essay that the crisis followed directly from the well-known
limitations of language itself, and the difficulties associated with inter-
pretation. We must understand the problem before considering possible
solutions.
While the financial press and other observers remain entranced by
the intricacies of Enron's Raptor financings, and more recently, by Leh-
man Brothers' use of the Repo 105 gimmick, and the derivatives used by
the Greek government, to name some of the more infamous deals, the
fundamental problem may remain hidden by the overwhelming details
of these poster children for the ills of the financial system. All of these
complex transactions fundamentally resemble far simpler solutions to
legal problems that have acquired the status of myth.
Let us begin by considering a few simple stories about the posture
that people take towards legal language.
In Israel, there is a prohibition against raising pigs "on the land"
given to the Jews by God. An enterprising farmer sees profit in running
a pig farm. How can this be done given the prohibition of the law?
Answer: Construct a series of pens that are elevated three feet
above the ground and raise the pigs on these platforms. The platforms
keep the pigs "off the land," so compliance with the law is preserved.
Both God and the secular authorities are reportedly happy with the
arrangement.
In Louisiana a number of years ago, a company proposed to issue
bonds to finance the construction of a casino. The company prepared to
launch the offering the next morning when a junior associate at the law
firm hired to represent the underwriters managing the bond offering
came up with a distressing discovery-the parish in which the casino
was to be built had an old law on the books that prohibited gambling.
How can the offering proceed in a timely fashion without obtaining a
delay producing amendment to this law?
Answer: Recognize that the casino operations do not constitute
"gambling;" rather, the casino is in the business of "gaming." Boldly
disclose in the offering memorandum that the financed activity does not
violate the law because "gaming" is not "gambling." A simple addition
to the offering memorandum inserted late at night at the financial print-
ers allows the offering to proceed as planned the next morning. The
associate is placed on the fast track to partnership for uncovering the law
and finding a solution.
In the early 1990s, an underwriter proposed an offering of securi-
3952012]
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ties to a Brazilian company. The negotiations initially went poorly
because the underwriter demanded a comprehensive covenant package
to protect against default risk. The chief financial officer of the company
expressed dismay, asserting that there was no history of default on obli-
gations of this sort in Brazil. The bankers asked incredulously about the
massive defaults in the 1970s in Brazil and other South American
countries.
Answer: The financial officer shook his head, explaining that all
those defaults involved "loans" and not "securities." The requested
enhanced protections should not be necessary because the transaction
involved securities and not loans. The offering proceeds with limited
protections. The bankers use the "loan" versus "securities" explanation
in their sales pitch to investors and the placement is a resounding
success.
Each of these stories has a happy ending (with reservation for the
pig farmer's confrontation with God at the pearly gates). The farmer
makes a profit, the casino prospers without intervention from the parish,
and the bond offering is repaid at maturity. In each case, the confronta-
tion between conduct and law is solved by making a category judgment
that the conduct falls outside, rather than inside, the regulated or other-
wise undesirable characterization.2
However, in the recent financial crises, the transaction participants
have made similar category judgments with less fortunate results.
Greece entered the European Union when it did not have the financial
strength to do so. Lehman presented itself to the market as more finan-
cially sound than circumstances warranted.'
II. THE CURRENT SITUATION AND A TENTATIVE EXPLANATION
The financial press is in uproar over news that Greece used sophis-
ticated financial products to mask the extent of its financial obligations.'
The revelation that Wall Street recently proposed continued use of finan-
cial engineering to prolong the charade-advice that Greece rejected-
2. The tales of the Israeli pig farmer and the associate participating in the offering for the
Louisiana casino had acquired the status of legend, as tales told late at night at financial printers
by more senior associates to their juniors. The author represented a participant in the Brazilian
transaction recounted above and thus the tale has the status of a first-hand report. The story of the
literal application of law to allow pig farming on the land given to the Jews by God also is
recounted in SLAVOJ ZIZEK, THE FRAGILE ABSOLUTE: OR, WHY IS THE CHRISTIAN LEGACY
WORTH FIGHTING FOR? 140-41 (2000) (contrasting the approach to rule compliance in the Jewish
religion with that found in the Christian tradition).
3. See Report of Exam'r Anton R. Valukas, at 6, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 439
B.R. 811 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 08-13555), available at http://lehmanreport.jenner.com.
4. Louise Story et al., Wall St. Helped to Mask Debt Fueling Europe's Crisis, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 14, 2010, at Al.
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adds to the outrage.' Thereafter, the cries against Wall Street intensified
with revelations that Lehman Brothers concealed up to $50 billion in
debt by using repurchase transactions to raise capital-transactions
which it reported as "sales" rather than short-term borrowings.' This
technique allowed Lehman Brothers to present itself to the market as
more financially sound than circumstances justified because it reported a
lower leverage ratio.7 Post-Enron, why should we expect bankers to pro-
pose schemes to clients that mask reality and, indeed, to use these tech-
niques for their own business reporting-and why do they continue to
get away with it? Did neither the bankers nor the regulators learn any-
thing from the U.S. experience with Enron and similar scandals?
The answer lies with what, in my prior analysis of Enron, I have
termed "the ethic of technical compliance."' This ethic assigns praise or
blame to conduct solely by reference to technical compliance with
rules.' Applying this ethic, there is nothing wrong with proposing a
derivative transaction with similar financial consequences to debt-even
with knowledge that this circumvents debt limits imposed for entry into
the E.U. Similarly, there is nothing wrong with structuring capital-rais-
ing activities that technically constitute "sales" rather than short-term
borrowings-even with knowledge that this paints a far more favorable
financial portrait than short-term borrowings would reflect.
In the Greek transactions, the savvy bankers almost certainly
obtained legal advice opining that the transactions technically complied
with law. We know that Lehman Brothers obtained legal advice that its
repurchase transactions constituted "sales" under United Kingdom
law-bolstering its aggressive financial reporting position.' 0 Legal
advice provides cover for participants by making proof of a crime diffi-
cult, even if laws were broken, because conscious knowledge of law-
breaking is a common prerequisite for finding criminal liability." Legal
5. In November of 2009, Gary D. Cohn, the president of Goldman Sachs, visited Athens to
propose a transaction to defer Greece's health care debt far into the future. See Story, supra note
3.
6. See Valukas, supra note 3, at 6.
7. Id. at 7.
8. See William H. Widen, Enron at the Margin, 58 Bus. LAW. 961, 965 (2003) [hereinafter
Widen, Enron at the Margin].
9. Id.
10. See Amir Efrati & Ashby Jones, Legal Experts Say Lehman Criminal Case Would Be
Difficult, WALL ST. J., March 13, 2010, at B3.
11. To find criminal liability, the law typically imposes the requirement of a "guilty mind" or
mens rea, in one form or another. In a securities law context, this requirement is typically referred
to as a scienter requirement. The details of particular mental state requirements for a finding of
liability are beyond the scope of this essay except to note that legal opinions and other evidence of
technical compliance with law are designed to negate any notion that the "perpetrators" could
have criminal liability because they did not realize they were doing anything that was against the
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advice may defeat scienter even if the opinions expressed are aggressive
or flat-out wrong because they provide evidence that the participants did
not intentionally violate the law. 12
To combat this approach to financial reporting and improve trans-
parency of markets, first we must identify and understand the phenome-
non of the ethic of technical compliance. Only then may we be in a
position to propose solutions to counter this mode of behavior. This
essay attempts to do both.
My point of departure for this inquiry is the observation that we are
facing a crisis in accepted modes of interpretation for legal texts. We
need to consider approaches to interpreting a broad range of legal
texts-constitutions, statutes, common law cases and contracts-to
understand the problem before considering solutions. The ethic of tech-
nical compliance shares a lineage with theories of interpretation as dis-
parate as the textualism advocated by Justice Scalia and the
deconstructionist methods of Jacques Derrida.
The problem posed by this ethic is decidedly not the problem of
criminal behavior on Wall Street. Just as the poor will always be with
us, so to too will criminals always be with us. My concern is not with
Scott Sullivan, Bernie Madoff, Lew Freeman, or Scott Rothstein. These
fraudsters clearly broke the law, and they knew they were doing so when
they acted." In their cases, regrettably, the text of the law and its associ-
ated sanctions failed to deter. This is a serious problem, but it is not my
primary concern.14
law. For a discussion of scienter requirements in securities cases, see Donald C. Langevoort,
Reflections on Scienter (and the Securities Fraud Case Against Martha Stewart that Never
Happened), 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1-17 (2006).
12. See Efrati & Jones, supra note 10.
13. There is no doubt that the crimes of Sullivan, Freeman, Madoff and Rothstein were
intentional violations of the law with knowledge of wrongdoing. See Scott Reeves, Lies, Damned
Lies and Scott Sullivan, FORBES, Feb. 17, 2005 ("I knew it was wrong," Sullivan said. "I knew it
was against the law, but I thought we'd make it through."); Defendant Lewis B. Freeman's
Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Freeman, Case No. 10-CR-20095-PCH (S.D. Fla. June
21, 2010) ("I want to begin by reaffirming that I am guilty of engaging in a criminal conspiracy.
During a period of over nine years, I knowingly and willfully misappropriated money from
matters in which I was appointed as a fiduciary by federal and state courts."); Defendant's
Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Rothstein, Case No. 09-60331-CR-Cohn (S.D. Fla.
June 4, 2010) ("Mr. Rothstein acknowledges that he not only stole other people's monies, he also
used it to corrupt the political process and enhance his power for personal gain."); Plea Allocution
of Bernard L. Madoff, United States v. Madoff, Doc. No. 09-CR-213(DC) (S.D.N.Y. March 12,
2009) (read in court) ("As I engaged in my fraud, I knew what I was doing was wrong, indeed
criminal.").
14. Charles Ponzi structured perhaps the most famous case of outright intentional financial
fraud-a structure in which funds received from recent investors were used to pay returns to prior
investors. This created the appearance of investment return where none actually existed-assets
simply did not backstop investments made. See generally MITCHELL ZUCKOFF, PONZI's SCHEME:
THE TRUE STORY OF A FINANCIAL LEGEND (2005); DONALD H. DuNN, PoNzl: THE INCREDIBLE
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Rather, my focus is on Jeffrey Skilling and Ken Lay of Enron, the
Greek finance ministers and Goldman Sachs, and the executives of Leh-
man Brothers (and their accounting and legal advisors). In these later
cases, the transactions at issue were structured technically to comply
with law. If these "technical compliers" are criminals, they are criminals
of a different and more troubling sort. Indeed, they may believe that they
are not "bad men" because their conduct complied with the rules laid
down.15
TRUE STORY OF THE KING OF FINANCIAL CONS (1975). Such an intentional scheme to defraud,
while interesting in its own right, is not the concern or focus of this essay. Like the more recent
scandal involving Bernard Madoff, Charles Ponzi knew the scheme was fraudulent and could not
withstand scrutiny. Similarly, this essay does not focus on problems associated with excessive
speculation. To be sure, fierce competitiveness and an appetite for risk taking may fuel the passion
for speculation which many believe threatens our modern financial markets. See generally
EDWARD CHANCELLOR, DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL SPECULATION
(2000). This essay's concern with the concept of "truth" is related to financial speculation only
insofar as accurate information is needed to backstop informed speculation or risk-taking to
distinguish that activity from mere gambling. The problem with the current ethics that govern
creation of transaction structure and associated canons of disclosure is precisely that it impedes
informed risk taking. Lastly, this essay does not expect that ethics lessons or regulation will lessen
Wall Street's ravenous pursuit of self-interest at the expense of its customers and clients, tales that
have been told by many. See generally Jim SALIM WITH R. FOSTER WINANS, THE GREAT WALL
STREET SWINDLE (2001). Rather, the hope is to show that the emperor has no clothes when Wall
Street markets transaction structures as a technique to manage and suppress unwelcome
disclosures which, if the unvarnished truth had been revealed, would have promoted informed
speculation (at the least) or, more likely, prevented transactions from proceeding because, like the
vampires of the horror genre, they could not withstand the sunshine.
15. In contrast to transactions known to be fraudulent or criminal, in Enron, the Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy, and the Greek Debt crisis, the parties attempt to comply with technical legal
requirements. The steps taken by Enron to make its transactions technically comply with law are
detailed in Widen, Enron at the Margin, supra note 8. Enron's attempts to technically comply with
law, and the shortcomings of this approach, are further detailed in a variety of places. See
WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE
COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 11 (2002) ("The transactions . . . that
had the greatest impact on Enron's financial statements involved four SPEs known as the
'Raptors."'), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/specinvO20102rptl.pdf. The
Powers Report was commissioned to conduct an investigation of a variety of related party
transactions and, in particular, the transactions that led to Enron's third-quarter 2001 earnings
charge and restatement. See generally PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN ENRON'S
COLLAPSE, S. REP. No. 107-10 (2002) (discussing the results of the Senate investigation into the
Enron failure), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/senpsi70802rpt.pdf; In re
Enron Corp., FIRST INTERIM REPORT OF NEAL BATSON, COURT-APPOINTED EXAMINER, No. 01-
16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2002) (describing various Enron structured financial
transactions), available at 2002 WL 31113331. The steps taken by Lehman Brothers to technically
comply with accounting rules in its Repo 105 transactions, including obtaining a legal opinion
from an English law firm, are detailed in Valukas, supra note 3. Commentators on the Greek debt
crisis assume the transactions at issue were perfectly legal. See, e.g., Story, supra note 4. Greece's
use of swaps with Goldman Sachs and the basis for asserting technical compliance with reporting
obligations, as well as the shortcomings of reporting, are described in a recent Eurostat report. See
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROSTAT, REPORT ON THE EDP METHODOLOGICAL Visrrs To GREECE
IN 2010 (May 12, 2011).
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The technical compliers pose a real challenge for the design of any
future financial regulatory reform, as well as the interpretive posture
taken by judges and regulators in administering the resulting system,
because they and their ethic of technical compliance call into question
the very possibility of creating an effective system of financial regula-
tion.' 6 I will argue that this ethic flourishes because conceptions of
morality have followed our conceptions of scientific knowledge. Scien-
tific knowledge has become an impersonal system of sentences in theo-
ries independent of a subject "knower."" When morality becomes
sentential, it subordinates the role of the internal relationship between an
actor and his conscience, measuring morality by conformity between an
external act and a system of sentences.' 8
The ethic requires that the lawmaker must get the text of the law
"just right" because the lawmaker cannot rely on any independent moral
system to guide the actions of those subject to law.19 Private and internal
notions of morality no longer function as a backstop that informs the
financial professional's stance towards the positive law.2 0 Recognizing
that business morality has become sentential is the first step towards
thinking about a solution. We are in a "battle of words," and to win this
battle, the legal system must wear its morality on its sleeve by expressly
including its vision of morality in the text of its laws. If the public can-
not win this battle (and it is not certain it can), then the war to save our
financial system may be lost. I conclude this essay with concrete sugges-
tions for how an element of public morality might be introduced into our
legislation.
III. WALL STREET: THE TRUE BELIEVERS IN THE ETHIC OF
TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE
Anecdotal evidence in the form of statements made by participants
in the Greek debt crisis and the collapse of Lehman Brothers support the
claim that much of Wall Street, as well as the applicable regulators,
operate in accord with the ethic of technical compliance.
The participants in the current Greek drama seem to have accepted
the ethic of technical compliance at face value-indeed, even the regula-
tors. E.U. Chief Finance Minister Olli Rehn already has focused on com-
pliance with rules, stating, "[i]t is clear that a profound investigation
16. See, David Reilly, Closing Lehman's Loophole, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2010, at B16
("Give Wall Street a rule and it will find a loophole.").
17. IAN HACKING, WHY DOES LANGUAGE MATTER TO PHILOSOPHY? 159 (1975).
18. See id. at 160-61.
19. See Widen, Enron at the Margin, supra note 8, at 999-1000.
20. Id.
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must be done on this matter, . . . and I will ensure that we conduct the
inquiry so we see whether all the rules were respected." 2 ' The Greek
finance minister, George Papaconstantinou, has countered that "such
swaps were legal when Greece used them."2 2 Gerald Corrigan, a manag-
ing director of Goldman Sachs, stated that, after reviewing his firm's
deals with Greece, "it is clear to me that there is nothing inappropriate
and it was in conformity with existing rules and procedures" at that
time.23 Michael Meister, financial affairs spokesman for German Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democrats, sums up the situation well
saying, "Goldman Sachs broke the spirit of the Maastricht Treaty,
though it is not certain it broke the law. . . . What is certain is that we
must never leave this kind of thing lurking in the shadows again." 24 It
appears the E.U. inquiry will take place in accord with the ethic of tech-
nical compliance.
Executives of Lehman Brothers have expressed similar sentiments,
most revealing of which is the firing of a "whistleblower" who ques-
tioned whether the use of the now infamous Repo 105 transactions vio-
lated Lehman's own internal ethics rules.25 At Lehman Brothers,
technical compliance with accounting rules trumped internally-prepared
ethical standards that suggested a different result. Some seem to believe
that the use of accounting rules in an aggressive manner is no big deal.26
Lehman's U.K. law firm that blessed the Repo 105 transaction as a "true
sale" has rejoiced that the Bankruptcy Examiner's Report did not chal-
lenge the technical correctness of their legal opinion."
The players in the Enron scandal made similar statements pointing
to their technical compliance with law.2 8
It is clear to me that the ethic of technical compliance is alive and
21. Stephen Castle, Pressure Rises on Greece to Explain and Fix Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,
2010, at B3.
22. Id.
23. See Jessica Papini, Goldman Executive: 'Nothing Inappropriate' in Greece Deal, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 23, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704454304575081541068
116062.html.
24. Elisa Martinuzzi & Maria Petrakis, EU Seeks Greek Swaps Disclosure After Ministry
Probe, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 15, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid
=A5MJFT2dMylU.
25. See Michael Corkery, Lehman Whistle-Blower's Fate: Fired, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2010,
at Cl.
26. See Max Abelson, The Repo Men's New Lehman Shrug, N.Y. OBSERVER, March 17,
2010, http://www.observer.com/2010/wall-street/repo-mens-newlehman-shrug.
27. Lehman Brothers' Former Heads Criticised for Lapses, BBC NEWS (Mar. 12, 2010),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8563604.stm (quoting a spokesperson for the firm saying, "[t]he
Examiner-who did not contact the firm during his investigations-does not criticise those
opinions or say or suggest that they were wrong or improper. We have reviewed the opinions and
are not aware of any facts or circumstances which would justify any criticism.").
28. See Widen, Enron at the Margin, supra note 8, at 964-65.
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well on Wall Street and that the regulatory challenge is to understand
this phenomenon and consider how best to counteract it.
IV. THE EFFECTS OF KNOWLEDGE BECOMING SENTENTIAL:
SCIENTIFIC AND MORAL
My proposal for understanding the ethic of technical compliance
starts with noting a structural similarity between the evolution of our
conception of scientific knowledge and Wall Street's conception of
moral knowledge-a conception that seems to permeate the business
world generally. We must focus closely on language usage because the
technical compliers pay close attention to the language of laws, rules,
and regulations.2 9 Language clearly matters to law-the point is so obvi-
ously true that we may fail to consider the implications of this fact.
At the end of Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy,o Ian
Hacking puts forth his theory that our concept of scientific knowledge
has evolved from the time of Descartes to become essentially sentential.
He believes that language matters to philosophy today for the same rea-
son that "ideas" mattered to philosophers in the 17th and 18th centu-
ries.3 1 Then, ideas served as the interface between a knowing subject and
what is known.32 Now, sentences perform that same mediating role.33 In
sum, in our time scientific knowledge has become sentential.3 4
In the Cartesian spirit, a large part of the Western philosophical
tradition conceived of knowledge as an internal relationship between a
subject "knower" and an object of knowledge." The objects of knowl-
edge were communicated to knowing subjects through "ideas."
Acquiring knowledge was analogized to the faculty of vision-the "see-
ing" of the truth through perception of the idea. 7 For example, the goal
of a mathematical proof was to internalize it by running the steps in the
proof faster and faster before the mind until you could "see" the correct-
ness of the proof in a single mental gaze." A demonstration or proof
was designed to be a "showing" to the inner eye, which, if sufficiently
clear and distinct, ensured its truth and resulted in knowledge.39 The
concept of "idea" was thought to be so basic as to not need a definition
29. See id.




34. Id. at 157-63.
35. Id. at 159.
36. Id. at 159-60.
37. Id. at 159-61.
38. Id. at 161-62.
39. Id.
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(or to be incapable of one).40
In contrast, most modem philosophers of science conceive of
knowledge as being "theoretical."4 1 By "theoretical," Hacking argues,
they mean a system of sentences or statements, as expounded by C. G.
Hempel, among others.42 Currently, a mathematical demonstration is
recognized as a sequence of sentences.4 3 This concept is reflected in W.
V. 0. Quine's observation that the "lore of our fathers is a fabric of
sentences."" Though Karl Popper disagrees with Hacking that knowl-
edge has changed, he does believe in "objective knowledge" which
resides in books, libraries and computer memories.4 5 Knowledge occu-
pies its own autonomous world, separate from knowing subjects, even
though it is a product of human effort." This allows for a theory of
knowledge-an epistemology-without a knowing subject. 7
Hacking's project is essentially analytic and descriptive. Having
noticed an evolution in the concept of knowledge, in which the need for
a knowing subject is subordinated, if not eliminated, he challenges the
reader to consider the implications of this development, but without sug-
gesting any concrete consequences that flow from this evolution. I con-
sider an extension of his observation that scientific knowledge has
become sentential, and ask: What evidence is there that moral knowl-
edge has become sentential and what would be the consequences of such
a development?
I believe the ethic of technical compliance provides an example of
moral knowledge becoming sentential. While, at one time, we theorized
that a central component of moral knowledge involved a relationship
between an action and an actor (examining the internal mental state of
the actor, just as knowledge required consideration of the internal mental
state of the knower), in many sectors of social life, consideration of the
mental state of the actor is subordinated or eliminated from
consideration.
The ethic of technical compliance appears to make this very move
because we find transaction participants defending their actions by refer-
ence to compliance with a text, while, at the same time, declining to
accept any duty to consider the broader implications of their actions for
40. Id. at 158-59.




45. Id. at 184-86.
46. Id. at 186.
47. Id. at 186-87.
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the financial system or society in general.4 8 The participants appear to
have no conscience and yet assert that they have done nothing wrong.4 9
They would appear to sleep well at night, but for the pesky inquiries of
regulators, prosecutors, and the press.
Just as a modern scientific theory is evaluated by a correspondence
between the world and a system of sentences that set forth the theory, so
the moral status of an action is evaluated by a correspondence between
the outward act and the system of sentences that comprise the moral
system. The morality of an action is not seen by the actor as involving
an appeal to any inward guide such as conscience, just as scientific
knowledge has become autonomous and no longer requires a knower-
the inner conscience once required to understand moral knowledge cor-
relates to the inner eye of reason formerly required to understand scien-
tific knowledge-and neither are needed any longer.
Such a moral system presents an additional problem for juridical
laws because the legal system, by including a scienter element for proof
of many crimes, retains a requirement to look at the inward state of the
actor as a prerequisite to finding liability."o Thus, even when an outward
act fails to conform to the system of sentences (and, thus, is "wrong" in
accord with the ethic), liability for the actor does not result because, by
and large, the criminal justice system does not use a strict liability sys-
tem for assigning fault.5 1 So, society's legal system does not blame the
actor, even though the pure form of the ethic would find criminal liabil-
ity. The system does not even adequately deter behavior that contra-
venes the ethic.
Indeed, adherents of the ethic of technical compliance may, them-
selves, believe in a hybrid system in which praiseworthy (or, at least,
acceptable) behavior is measured by technical compliance with rules,
whereas blameworthy behavior is measured by a two-part test: (i) failure
to comply with rules, coupled with (ii) knowledge of wrongdoing. Such
a hybrid system fosters an aggressive stance toward the rules in which
the subject has every incentive to engage in conduct that goes to the very
edge of the law. In so doing, behavior can be expected to stray over the
line from time to time. Indeed, the structure of the system breeds this
result.
Though the ethic of technical compliance may treat morality as sen-
tential, this essay next considers whether such an approach to interpreta-
tion of law is respectable.
48. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
49. See Abelson, supra note 26.
50. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (General Requirements of Culpability).
51. Id.
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V. IS THE ETHIC OF TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE A RESPECTABLE
APPROACH TO LAW?
When press revelations expose examples of the ethic of technical
compliance at work, a first reaction often condemns the financial engi-
neering as the handiwork of corrupt people. To be sure, to understand
one possible mindset that continues to propose schemes of this sort, you
must return to Oliver Wendell Holmes. He famously observed that, if
you truly want to understand law, you must understand it from the view-
point of the "bad man" whose conduct is influenced solely by considera-
tion of sanctions.52 If technical compliance avoids liability, then the
"bad man" will take action if profit is expected. The "bad man" either
assumes an amoral position or, perhaps, an egoistic stance. Indeed,
Holmes suggested that the law would be improved if it used a vocabu-
lary that banned all words with an ethical or moral connotation in gen-
eral usage because these words lead to confusion." For Holmes, law and
morality are separate spheres (or, at least, the legal advisor best under-
stands the law if he assumes this stance).54
The ethic of technical compliance, however, does not compel this
standpoint. An adherent of the ethic of technical compliance may fall
into a third camp-that technically complying with rules in this way
truly is moral-and not simply moral from the standpoint of ethical
egoism. 55
To motivate the idea that the rule-following behavior at the core of
the ethic of technical compliance may constitute a legitimate ethical
stance, consider a few examples far from the field of business. Sincere
followers of some of the world's great religions take similar stances in
their personal lives. This can be seen in the procedures followed by
orthodox Jews in the observance of the Sabbath (for example, pre-
programmed schedules to allow use of elevators in hospitals and apart-
ment buildings on Saturday) and in the practices of devout Muslims to
obtain financing in compliance with the strictures of Sharia law (for
example, using leases and other financial devices to finance home
purchases without technically making interest payments).
We must acknowledge that these instances of technical compliance
with religious laws are sincerely believed by devout followers who are
neither "bad men" nor ethical egoists. Their personal religious morality
52. See 0. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
53. See id. at 459-62.
54. See id. at 459.
55. See Louis P. POJMAN & JAMES FIESER, ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG 87 (7th
ed., 2011) ("Ethical egoism is the moral view that everyone ought always to do those acts that will
best serve his or her own best self interest.").
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simply contains a component in which the ethical or the moral consists
of precise and technical adherence to the rules laid down by their faith.
What is troubling about the financial situation is simply this. I sus-
pect many external observers would say it was morally wrong for the
bankers to have worked with Greece to circumvent the E.U. debt limita-
tions.56 All parties knew well that these limits existed to protect the E.U.
from just the sort of financial crisis that has occurred, but also knew that
clever financial engineering could circumvent the limits. Circumventing
the E.U.'s limits is exactly what the parties set out to do with apparent
disregard for consequences other than their own potential liability for
technical law-breaking." We must, however, accept the possibility that
no overriding ethical principles guided their actions precisely because
they equate the ethical with technical legal compliance. It would be
more convenient, in some sense, to simply dismiss their behavior as the
acts of bad men or selfish egoists.
When no independent system of beliefs guides action independent
of legal considerations focused on technical compliance, the regulatory
challenge becomes acute because one suspects the problem is wide-
spread-not limited to just the bad or the selfish. The lawmakers cannot
expect that laws will be interpreted using any principle of charity" that
looks beyond the words of legislation to the underlying intent behind the
rules. If a large segment of the population refuses to apply a principle of
charity in interpreting the rules because they honestly believe they are
doing nothing wrong (without simply being selfish), then they place
56. Indeed, negative publicity surrounding the transactions with Greece and other matters has
prompted Goldman Sachs to note "adverse publicity" as a risk factor in its most recent annual
report filed with the SEC. See The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Form 10-K for the fiscal year
ended December 31, 2009, Commission File Number: 001-14965 at 34-35, available at http:
//www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/886982/0000950 12 3 10 0 184 64/y8 l 91 4elOvk.htm#113 (filed
Feb. 26, 2010). Prior to reports of Goldman Sachs' involvement in the Greek financial crisis, the
firm had been compared to a "great vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity" based
on its involvement in other financial crises. Matt Taibbi, The Great American Bubble Machine,
ROLLING STONE (April 5, 2010, 3:58 PM), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-great
american-bubble-machine-20100405.
57. See Papini, supra note 23 (noting that a deal set up by Goldman "helped mask the true
level of Greece's indebtedness until recently," but quoting a Goldman director saying, "it was in
conformity with existing rules and procedures").
58. The concept of using a principle of charity in interpretation, often attributed to the
philosopher, W. V. 0. Quine, in his analysis of radical translation, appears to have been coined by
N. L. Wilson. See N. L. Wilson, Substances without Substrata, 12 REV. METAPHYSIcs 521 (1958).
This principle states that a translator should adopt a translation that maximizes the number to true
utterances on the charitable view that the speaker of an unknown language attempts to speak the
truth. I use the idea of a principle of charity here in a broader sense of assuming that a rule-maker
had a purpose of fostering transparency when he adopts a system of disclosure. See generally
HACKING, supra note 17, at 148.
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enormous pressure on the rule-maker to get the text of the law "just
right"-and this is very hard to do.
Both deconstructionist and textualist theories argue, from a princi-
pled position, that the text of the law is all that should be considered in
interpretation. Accordingly, the essay turns to an examination of those
theories.
VI. DERRIDA's DECONSTRUCTION
The ethic of technical compliance requires that the text be "just
right" because, whether they know it or not, the adherents of this ethic
are implicitly following aspects of Jacques Derrida's theory of decon-
structionist interpretation. According to this view, all we have is the
text of the law, without resort to the intentions of the authors to guide
us.6 This theory of interpretation applies to any text, including a law or
regulation, because the text of the law is merely a system of signs dis-
connected from a speaker.6 ' When language appears in text, as opposed
to direct discourse, it becomes a separate object in itself.62 This stance
towards a text provides a principled basis for bankers to ignore the
apparent intent behind E.U. regulation that limits debt because recourse
to authorial intent is an inappropriate posture to take when confronted
with any text. This is so even if the bankers suspect a legislative intent
behind a regulation. Chasing authorial intent is chasing a chimera. (To
be sure, as reflected in Goldman Sachs's public pronouncements for
example, the bankers do not admit to being deconstructionists, instead
claiming that they will adhere to both the letter and the spirit of laws.) 63
59. See generally, JACQUEs DERRIDA & JOHN D. CAPUTO, DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL:
A CONVERSATION WITH JACQUES DERRIDA (John D. Caputo ed., 1997).
60. Id. at 130 ("By the 'law' . . . Derrida means the positive structures that make up judicial




63. See Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Goldman Sachs 2001 Annual Report, Business
Principles No. 2, http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-firmlinvestorrelations/financial-reports/
annual reports/2001/html/pmciples/principle 2.html ("We are dedicated to complying fully with
the letter and spirit of the laws, rules and ethical principles that govern us."). Perhaps, in the case
of the Greek transactions, Goldman Sachs found it hard to reconcile its dedication to complying
with the spirit of the laws with three other of its principles-Principle No. 1, which states that its
clients' interests always come first, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Goldman Sachs 2001 Annual
Report, Business Principles No. 1, http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-firmi/investorrelations/
financial-reports/annual-reports/2001/html/principles/principlel.html; Principle No. 3, which
says, "[o]ur goal is to provide superior returns to our shareholders," Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,
Goldman Sachs 2001 Annual Report, Business Principles No. 3, http://www2.goldmansachs.com/
ourfirm/investorrelations/financial-reports/annual-reports/2001/html/principles/principle_3.
html; and Principle No. 5, which says "[w]e stress creativity and imagination in everything we
do," Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Goldman Sachs 2001 Annual Report, Business Principles No. 5,
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By claiming that Wall Street shares Derrida's deconstructionist
stance towards texts, I do not mean to suggest that the two share a com-
mon ethic. For Wall Street and the ethic of technical compliance, moral
conduct consists in following the precise words of a text-there is no
other moral order. Derrida and other deconstructionists do not adopt the
same posture towards justice. 64 For Wall Street, morality has become
sentential-there is nothing more. For Derrida, justice is decidedly non-
sentential and lies beyond the text of any positive law:
A judge, if he wants to be just, cannot content himself with applying
the law. He has to reinvent the law each time. If he wants to be
responsible, to make a decision, he has not simply to apply the law,
as a coded program, to a given case, but to reinvent in a singular
situation a new just relationship; that means that justice cannot be
reduced to a calculation of sanctions, punishments, or rewards. That
may be right or in agreement with the law, but that is not justice.
Justice, if it has to do with the other, with the infinite distance of the
other, is always unequal to the other, is always incalculable. You can-
not calculate justice.65
Derrida should not be misunderstood to say that anything goes with the
interpretation of texts:
This does not mean that we should not calculate. We have to calcu-
late as rigorously as possible. But there is a point or limit beyond
which calculation must fail, and we must recognize that.66
From this perspective there is a relationship between law and jus-
tice: law without justice is a "monster," and justice without law is a
"wimp."6 Justice provides the motivation to change the positive law by
improving it-even though justice may be an impossible limit that we
can never expect to reach.
Interestingly, this idea that justice stands beyond positive law was
hinted at long ago when English courts were divided between "law" and
"equity." 68 When a claim could not be pursued at common law-pre-
http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-firmlinvestorrelations/financial-reports/annual-reports/
2001/html/principles/principle_5.html.
64. See DERRIDA & CAPUTO, supra note 59, at 17 ("I cannot know that I am just. I can know
that I am right. I can see that I act in agreement with norms, with the law. . . . But that does not
mean that I am just.").
65. DERRIDA & CAPUTO, supra note 59, at 17.
66. Id. at 19.
67. Id. at 136 ("For justice and law are not supposed to be opposites but to interweave: laws
ought to be just, otherwise they are monsters; and justice requires the force of law, otherwise it is
a wimp."). The idea that law can be a monster in this sense traces to Drucilla Cornell. See
DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE LIMrr 167 (1992).
68. I do not mean to suggest by this remark that interpretation and application of the law
should be the same for interpreting a constitution, a statute, or a common law rule. Different
considerations apply in the different spheres.
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cisely because the "text" of the doctrine as reflected in case law did not
provide a remedy-a plaintiff could pursue a claim in a court of equity,
which existed precisely to allow appeals to justice not grounded in com-
mon law. Structurally, most U.S. courts today sit as courts of both law
and equity thus incorporating the general idea that the court may,
indeed, appeal to general principles of justice. Equity itself, however,
has developed its own system of rules that, in many respects, has
become as formal as the rules of law. Equity has evolved into a parallel
system of positive textual law-it has become sentential just like the
common law whose limitations it was designed to remedy.6 9 Thus, in
modem times, an appeal to equitable principles is properly seen as an
appeal to another text and not the mysterious justice that lies beyond the
text of law.
While a deconstructionist approach to law recognizes the existence
of a principle of justice beyond the text, the doctrine of textualism
advanced by Justice Scalia does not endorse a policy of going beyond
the text to find justice. The essay now turns to that doctrine.
VII. SCALIA'S TEXTUALISM
Distrust of the search for authorial intent does not confine itself to
deconstructionists. Justice Scalia of the United States Supreme Court
expresses disapproval of reference to legislative intent as a method for
interpretation of statutes; Oliver Wendell Holmes expressed doubt about
reference to intent in interpreting statutes; and the Allies required that
German courts eschew reference to legislative intent and the spirit of the
law as part of reforming the German legal system after World War II.70
The ethic of technical compliance resembles a respected "textual-
ist" theory of statutory interpretation. The textualist approach to statu-
tory interpretation is a formal approach that limits the interpretive
process to an examination of the ordinary meaning of the words used in
69. For a discussion of law and equity, see Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered the
Common Iaw: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 909, 914-21 (1987).
70. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
16-18 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). Compare Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 511 (2006)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("[T]he use of legislative history is illegitimate and ill advised in the
interpretation of any statute . . . .") with Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal
Interpretation, 12 HARv. L. REV. 417, 417-18, 419 (1899) ("[W]e ask, not what this man meant,
but what those words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in the
circumstances in which they were used. . . . We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask
only what the statute means."). In Nazi Germany, judges rejected formalistic textualism, arguing
that statutes should be interpreted in light of the intent of the lawmakers and not narrowly
confined to the text of the statute-a practice the Allies changed as part of the reform of the
German legal system. See Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U.
CHI. L. REv. 636, 636-37 (1999).
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the statute.7' Appeals to extrinsic sources such as, (i) the intent of the
legislature, (ii) identification of the problem the statute was intended to
remedy (i.e. the "purpose" for the statute), or (iii) general principles of
justice and fairness, are off-limits. Though these three reasons to reject
extrinsic sources as a basis for interpretation overlap, they each have a
slightly different focus.
There are specific structural reasons to reject the intent of the legis-
lature as relevant to statutory interpretation-reasons that do not support
the rejection of the search for authorial intent in the case of a single
author as urged by the deconstructionists for literary works. First, ascrib-
ing intent to an artificial entity, such as a legislative body or a corpora-
tion, is problematic because we typically think of intent as a property of
individuals. Artificial entities do not have mental states even though
individual persons who form part of the artificial entity do have mental
states. Second, in the lawmaking process, it is common for individual
legislators to make statements about the intent of the law. These state-
ments often get published as part of a legislative history for the law. Yet,
these statements may be the view of but a single person. They were not
voted on and approved by the rule-making body as a whole. Reference
to legislative history of this sort may be criticized as undemocratic:
[T]extualist judges have contended, with much apparent impact, that
courts should not treat [committee reports or sponsors' statements] as
authoritative evidence of statutory meaning. These textualists have
predicated their resistance to such use of legislative history on two
important premises . . . . First, textualist judges argue that a 535-
member legislature has no "genuine" collective intent with respect to
matters left ambiguous by the statute itself. Even if Congress did
have a collective intent, they add, courts act improperly when they
equate the views of a committee or sponsor with the intent of the
entire Congress and the President. Second, textualists contend that
giving decisive weight to legislative history assigns dispositive effect
to texts that never cleared the constitutionally mandated process of
72bicameralism and presentment.
Even scholars who disagree with Justice Scalia's textualism, such as
Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe, agree with him that use of legis-
lative history is problematic for these very reasons.
Purposive or teleological interpretation of statutes is, perhaps, the
71. SCALIA, supra note 70, at 24 ("Words do have a limited range of meaning, and no
interpretation that goes beyond that range is permissible.").
72. John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 673,
674-75 (1997).
73. See ScALIA, supra note 70, at 65.
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dominant theory of statutory interpretation today.7 4 While an adherent of
purposive interpretation would certainly consider legislative history as
an important source of information to determine the purpose behind a
statute, it is not the only source." The interpreter might refer to the
general structure of the law and the state of society at the time the law
was passed to uncover what its purpose must have been.76 In this mode,
the interpreter adopts the posture of an ideal legislator or a reasonable
legislator (rather than simply attempting to discern what actual legisla-
tors intended)." Justice Stephen Breyer advocates for a strong form of
purposive interpretation in his book, Active Liberty: Interpreting a Dem-
ocratic Constitution." This approach can be criticized on grounds simi-
lar to the criticism of the search for actual legislative intent: it
"overlooks the strongest argument against the purposive approach: that
it tends to override legislative compromises."" The approach also may
be criticized because it tends to convert judges into legislators: "[i]f
judges are asked to say what 'reasonable' legislators would like to do,
they are all too likely to say what they themselves would like to do."s0
The criticism of making appeals to concepts of justice and fairness
is more complex. To be sure, appeals to justice and fairness to interpret
statutes might be faulted on grounds similar to the objection to purpo-
sive interpretation: they simply give the judge the power to insert per-
sonal preferences into the law. Though an appeal to justice would not
offend a deconstructionist such as Derrida, it worries textualists such as
Justice Scalia because of the apparent unfettered discretion it bestows on
judges." Derrida welcomes appeals to justice, recognizing this as inte-
gral to a decision that is not mechanical.82 Justice Scalia looks for a
74. See SCALIA, supra note 70, at 16 ("You will find it frequently said ... that the judge's
objective in interpreting a statute is to give effect to 'the intent of the legislature.' This principle
... goes back at least as far as Blackstone.").
75. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 82
(2008) ("[Judges] use [ ] purpose (along with the language, structure, and history) to determine the
proper interpretation").
76. See id.
77. See id. at 83-84.
78. Id.
79. Richard Posner, Justice Breyer Throws Down the Gauntlet, 115 YALE L.J. 1699, 1710
(2006).
80. Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Breyer's Democratic Pragmatism, 115 YALE L.J. 1719,
1733-34 (2006).
81. See DERRIDA & CAPUTO, supra note 59, at 136; SCALIA, supra note 70, at 18 ("When [a
judge is] told to decide, not on the basis of what the legislature said, but on the basis of what it
meant .. . that will surely bring [the judge] to the conclusion that the law means what [he] think[s]
it ought to mean.").
82. See DERRIDA & CAPUTO, supra note 59, at 136 ("[J]ustice and the law are not supposed to
be opposites but to interweave . . . .").
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more bounded exercise, if not a strictly mechanical one. Indeed, for a
textualist, justice and fairness may consist precisely in not going outside
the text adopted by a democratic process-recognizing that the role of
the courts is limited.84
The textualist believes that there is a correct approach to interpreta-
tion of legal texts. That approach eschews a search for legislative intent
and more general purposes, instead focusing on a search for "original
intent." 5 Original intent is confined to the intent of the words in the
text-whether it be a constitution, a statute, or a regulation-as those
words were understood in the relevant community of language speakers
at the time of promulgation of the text.8 6 This approach is intended to
involve an objective search for meaning.87 The search is objective
because language is a public phenomenon, and we may investigate how
the language of the text was used at the time relevant to the interpreta-
tion. The textualist must allow, however, that the search for original
intent involves elements of indeterminacy."
First, to the extent that the inquiry is historical in nature, difficulties
always attend attempts to look into the past, and the more time that has
elapsed, the more difficult the search. Second, indeterminacy flows from
attempts to define the relevant community of language speakers to be
considered. Language use changes over time. Evidence for language use
at any point in time-say 1791-may require consideration of historical
materials that both pre-date and post-date the time of promulgation of
the text. How temporally far afield may examination of historical mater-
ials range?
Beyond the temporal problems that attend a search for original
intent, the scope of the relevant community of language speakers may
present additional problems. In one sense, when a law applies through-
out the United States-such as the U.S. Constitution or a federal stat-
ute-we might say that the question of the relevant community of
language speakers is easily answered. The community should be the citi-
zens of the United States.
Several objections might be raised to this simple reply. First, is it
83. See SCALIA, supra note 70, at 25 (praising the oft-derided "formalistic" nature of
textualism).
84. See id. at 23 ("To be a textualist . .. [o]ne need only hold the belief that judges have no
authority to pursue those broader purposes or write those new laws.").
85. See id. at 38 (discussing the use of writings by constitutional framers to understand how
the Constitution was originally understood).
86. See id. at 38 ("What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute:
the original meaning of the text .
87. Id.
88. See id. at 38 (discussing the use of outside texts to determine the original meaning of the
constitutional framers).
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not unrealistic to assume a monolithic use of language across the United
States at any particular point in time? Second, and perhaps more impor-
tantly, even if such a monolithic usage might be constructed, should that
usage apply in the context of specialized legislation? For example,
should financial regulation be administered against the backdrop of a
monolithic national usage of financial terms or, instead, should adminis-
tration take place using a community of language speakers made up of
accountants, bankers and lawyers? The question of the appropriate com-
munity of language speakers is even more acute when one considers that
juries will operate on the periphery of administration of specialized
financial legislation, and these juries will almost certainly not include
financial professionals.
Despite these problems with implementing textualism, at least we
can understand the approach. We must recognize, however, that a textu-
alist does not consider only a single text during the interpretive exercise.
Though a textualist might, at first blush, make a claim to confining
every inquiry to the text of a particular law, the foregoing discussion
makes clear that this assertion is inaccurate because the textualist does in
fact consult other "texts" to arrive at an interpretation. To see that this is
so, we might make a fruitful comparison to principles of contract
interpretation.
The parol evidence rule forms a cornerstone of black letter contract
law. Under this rule, a court's inquiry into the interpretation of an inte-
grated contract must be confined to the four corners of the document
(absent some ambiguity in the contractual language).8 9 This rule oper-
ates to exclude consideration of prior and contemporaneous written and
oral agreements because they are extrinsic to the contract document
itself.90 Much like a statute in the view of the textualist, an integrated
contract is one that expresses the complete, exclusive and final expres-
sion of the parties' agreement. 91 Nevertheless, statutory modifications of
this common law contract doctrine counteract the unreality of this
approach to contracts as texts.
For example, under the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), in
contracts for a sale of goods, the party to a contract always is free to
appeal to usage of trade, course of dealing and course of performance to
explain the meaning of an integrated contract. 9 2 While this excludes evi-
dence of prior or contemporaneous agreements that are extrinsic to the
contract in question-other forms of extrinsic evidence that might
89. U.C.C. § 2-202 (2011).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. U.C.C. § 2-202(a) (2011).
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inform judgments about usage are permitted.9 3 The interpretive norm
merely excludes extrinsic evidence of competing contracts. Other evi-
dence for the usage of the contract terms within the relevant community
of language users is permitted.
The UCC reflects a hierarchy of potential communities of language
users relevant to contract interpretation. This hierarchy reflects the sort
of challenge facing the textualist when he attempts to define the relevant
"market" of language users to interpret a law. The UCC defines the rele-
vant market for contract interpretation, in general, as the trade in which
the contract participants are operating. 94 If the parties themselves, how-
ever, have a prior course of dealing that evidences a particular usage,
then the relevant community of language users shrinks to the usage
adopted by the two contracting parties by giving priority to language
usage by the parties over usage in the trade.95 The relevant community
of language users further shrinks along temporal lines if the contract is a
long-term contract and there is a course of performance under the very
contract in question to which the court might refer.9 6 In this case, the
usage reflected in the course of performance of the particular contract
takes priority over prior use between the parties in previous contracts or
the language use prevalent in the trade in general.97 The UCC approach
to contract interpretation reflects the reality that language usage often is
context-sensitive and that a relevant community of language users first
must be established as a prerequisite to proper interpretation.
Just as the judge interpreting a contract may ignore prior and con-
temporaneous "texts" as an illegitimate source for interpreting an inte-
grated contract, so the textualist will ignore legislative history as an
illegitimate text to consult in interpreting a law. The prior or contempo-
raneous agreements are illegitimate because they are too close in form to
the integrated contract and threaten its legitimacy; so too the legislative
history is too close in form to the law under review because it threatens
to replace it.
The prior and contemporaneous agreements usurp the authority and
sanctity of the integrated contract, and destroy its utility, because the
very purpose of using an integrated contract is to reduce the contract to a
single and complete document. Allowing consideration of prior and con-
temporaneous agreements undermines this very purpose. Similarly, the
reference to legislative history usurps the authority and sanctity of the
93. Id.
94. See U.C.C. § 1-303 (2011).
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written law both because it is not adopted in a process that gives the law
democratic legitimacy and because there are good reasons to believe that
the legislative history may have been created in ways that attempt to
undermine the legislative process (for the history is not approved by
vote in the relevant legislative bodies and individual legislators may
insert self-serving language into the history).
Prior and contemporaneous agreements and legislative histories are
the wrong sorts of texts to consult because they directly challenge the
function of the primary text under consideration. When the judge con-
siders, usage of trade, course of dealing, or course of performance to
interpret a contract, however, he is considering texts of another sort-
trade manuals, prior contracts, and testimony. Similarly, when the textu-
alist considers historical materials to interpret a law as part of discerning
its original meaning, he almost certainly will consult texts such as
books, letters, and press reports.
In each case, a direct reference to dictionary definitions (which one
sometimes encounters in court decisions) involves an express reference
to a text-the dictionary quoted. Further, the reference to "usage" in a
community of language users involves an implicit reference to a more
ubiquitous and ephemeral text of sorts-the unwritten rules of pragmat-
ics, semantics, and syntax that operate in the background of language
use. Thus, it is wrong to say that the textualist only consults a single text
when interpreting a law. Rather, textualism attempts to exclude consid-
eration of certain types of texts when interpreting the law just as a judge
excludes certain types of texts when interpreting a contract. They both
more accurately might be called "selective textual exclusionists."
The indefiniteness associated with the search for original meaning
reveals how spaces of ambiguity exist, which can be used to create loop-
holes that avoid regulation. Identification of the importance of usage in a
community of language users, however, provides another clue to how
Wall Street might justify the creation of novel financial transactions that
circumvent disclosure rules.
VIII. CREATION OF MEANING THROUGH USE: GENUS WORDS,
SPECIES WORDS AND DERIVATIVE CONTRACTS
One way to understand the operation of the ethic of technical com-
pliance is to view it as a battle of linguistic usage between genus words
and species words, particularly when a new financial product is invented
and assigned a new name. This battle over usage took place when, in the
early 1980s, Wall Street unveiled the "interest rate swap" to replace the
4152012]
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"back-to-back loan."9 8 The interest rate swap contract ushered a new
financial animal into the transaction zoo known as the "derivative con-
tract," or "swap" for short. I witnessed this process at the start of my
legal career on Wall Street. A simple example illustrates this battle.
Assume that the term "contract" describes a universe of discourse.
In this universe, the terms "debt," "gambling," and "insurance" operate
as genus words that denote different kinds of contracts. Species of debt
contracts include "loans, "mortgages," and "bonds." Species of gam-
bling contracts include wagers on "horse races," "blackjack," and "rou-
lette." Species of insurance contracts include "car insurance," "health
insurance," and "life insurance." In the regulatory world of contracts,
classification as a "debt contract" requires that the contract be disclosed
in financial statements, classification as a "gambling contract" means
that the contract is illegal (except in carefully delimited circumstances),
and classification as an "insurance contract" means that only designated
legal entities (i.e., insurance companies) may offer insurance contracts to
the public. In stylized form, this describes the state of the world in the
early 1980s before Wall Street invented the "derivative contract."
The creation of this new financial product presented the regulatory
system with a choice: Should swaps be treated as a species of one of the
three established genus classifications, or should the swap instead be
seen as a new genus of contract? The ramifications of the classification
choice are significant. If the swap were treated as a new species of an
existing genus, then it would fit into an existing regulatory framework
that requires disclosure, is illegal, or may be offered only by designated
companies. If, on the other hand, the swap were treated as a new genus,
it would fall outside all existing schemes of regulation. Usage of the
terms "derivative contract" and "swap," after an uncertain start, evolved
into a separate genus category. However, this evolution of usage was
actively managed by interested parties.
In particular, Wall Street worked hard to ensure that the term
"swap" gained acceptance as a genus word and not a species word when
it entered the universe of discourse as a new form of contract. Accept-
ance of "swap" as a genus word was the course preferred by business
because it avoided the burden of existing regulation in the three forms of
debt, gambling, and insurance. The battle for acceptance of a word as a
genus word and not a species word is a complex process undertaken at
many levels. The creation of the industry group, the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association (ISDA), certainly contributed to the idea
98. See Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Cost of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J.
CORP. L. 211, 218-20 (1997).
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that swaps were a new genus. 99
The development of standard terms, conditions, and contracts for
swaps further contributed to the idea that swap contracts were different
because they were documented on their own special forms developed by
ISDA. 1oo The original swaps were plain vanilla interest rate swaps in
which Party A exchanged a fixed rate of interest computed with refer-
ence to a notional principal amount with Party B for a floating rate of
interest, typically LIBOR (the London Interbank Offered Rate), com-
puted on the same notional amount.101 As participants became more
comfortable with this new transaction form, they began documenting
ever more complex swaps using ISDA forms. The market realized that
the streamlined document forms might be used to exchange almost any-
thing financial (not just interest rates). This insight led to, among other
things, the credit default swaps one sees today.
In the early days of swaps, the derivatives industry focused inten-
sively on the concern over gambling contracts, obtaining legal opinions
in various jurisdictions confirming that swaps were not a form of gam-
bling contract. As the market grew, the participants kept telling them-
selves that swaps were a new genus, and they behaved as if swaps were
not a species of regulated contract. This growing usage via practice gave
an aura of safety in numbers. If the regulators did not agree with market
usage treating swaps as a new genus, then everybody in the industry
would have violated the regulations. Not content to rest with the devel-
oping common usage given to the term "swap," the industry also sought
regulatory clarification to confirm this usage.
One example of strengthening this "genus" usage through legisla-
tion is The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 signed by
President Clinton. 10 2 It prohibits states from regulating credit default
swaps as insurance. 10 3 Another example, also signed by President Clin-
ton, is the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999,104 which
explicitly exempts security-based swap agreements (a derivative finan-
cial product based on another security's value or performance which
includes credit default swaps) from regulation by the SEC.' It does this
by amending the Securities Act of 1933, Section 2A, and the Securities
99. See id. at 219 n.43 ("In 1984, a group of swaps dealers formed the International Swap
Dealers Association, now called the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), and
ISDA has produced standardized swap documentation since then.").
100. See id.
101. See id. at 219.
102. See 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
103. Id. § 2.
104. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2006).
105. Id. § 6802(e)(1)(C).
4172012]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Exchange Act of 1934, Section 3A, to make clear that these swaps are
excluded from the definition of "security" so as to escape regulation. 106
Legislative efforts are not exclusively one way. Recently, a New York
State assemblyman announced legislation that would regulate credit
default swaps as insurance.10 7 However, this effort to confirm new
financial terms as species words, rather than genus words, appears to be
the exception.
One should not underestimate the insidious role that campaign
finance (and the absence of meaningful reform) plays in the species ver-
sus genus battle over usage. Complex rules-based regulation is a fertile
ground for needed "clarifications" in usage through legislation. The
financial services industry and their lobbyists work hard to achieve these
regulatory enhancements to usage of terms. The success of this activity
depends on access to our senators and congressmen. This access is
enhanced through campaign contributions. The recent Supreme Court
decision on campaign finance, which confirms the treatment of corpora-
tions as "persons," will do nothing to help this situation.10 To an extent,
the legislative bodies that decry the ethic of technical compliance find
themselves in a performative inconsistency when they facilitated the
very development of usages that place financial transactions outside the
scope of regulation.
I do not mean to suggest that the classification exercise is simply a
page out of Alice in Wonderland.10 9 Derivative contracts do, indeed,
bear characteristics that resemble debt, gambling, and insurance con-
tracts, but there are differences, at least in many cases. An alternate
approach would have been to treat swaps as subject to all three regimes
of regulation. Perhaps, however, borrowing a page from classifications
in biology, our tendency is to make classifications exclusive rather than
overlapping (e.g., a whale is either a fish or a mammal, but it is not
both).
The process by which specific words acquire, through use, a mean-
ing that facilitates the avoidance of regulation is not the only problem.
106. Perhaps it should come as no surprise that a President who famously deconstructed the
word "is" would be receptive to legislation clarifying the meaning of financial terms in this way.
"It depends on what the meaning of the word 'is' is. If the-if he-if 'is' means is and never has
been, that is not-that is one thing. If it means there is none, that was a completely true
statement. . . Now, if someone had asked me on that day, are you having any kind of sexual
relations with Ms. Lewinsky, that is, asked me a question in the present tense, I would have said
no. And it would have been completely true." THE STARR REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 105-310, at
n. 1128. (1998).
107. See Matthew Leising, NY Assemblyman's Bill Would Regulate Credit Swaps as
Insurance, BLOOMBERo NEWS WIRE, March 25, 2010.
108. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
109. ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND, LEWIS CARROLL (1865).
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We need also consider whether our use of more general terms like "true"
and "false" contributes to the successful design of structures that circum-
vent financial regulation. Just such an evolution in our usage of "true"
and "false" also may have taken place.110
IX. THE CONTRAST BETWEEN MODERN AND ANCIENT
CONCEPTIONS OF TRUTH
What general conditions allow Wall Street to arbitrage truth? Ironi-
cally, the answer may lie in the transformation of the notion of truth
from its original Greek meaning in classical times, described by Heideg-
ger in his lectures on Parmenides."' The Greek word for truth is
alethea-sometimes translated as "unconcealedness."1 2 Truth is that
which is unveiled. The Greek word for false is pseudo."' However, in
usage, pseudo does not always simply mean "concealed" as the counter
to "unveiling." It can mean an appearance that is dissembling. The
nuance is lost in our current conception of the "false" as the counterword
for "truth" because we ground falsity in misstatements and omissions.
The distinction is illustrated by the difference between a name assumed
by an imposter and a name used by an author as a "psuedonym"-a
false name. An imposter assumes a name falsely; this is a classic mis-
statement because the name used does not apply to the person who uses
it. In contrast, the pseudonym intentionally conceals the author without
being a misstatement because it correctly refers to the author while
simultaneously concealing his identity. It is a concealment assumed by
an author that fosters appearance by allowing a work to be published.
Applied to Greece, labeling a financial obligation as a derivative
allowed a transaction to proceed under a pseudonym. Unlike the mis-
statement perpetrated by an imposter, the appellation "derivative" does
apply to the transactions structured by Wall Street because Greece
entered into derivatives trades. Yet, classification as a derivative con-
cealed the true extent of Greece's overall financial commitments. Like
the pseudonym, this was the very purpose of using a derivative-con-
cealment without misplaced reference amounting to a misstatement.
110. The law relating to the treatment of swap and derivatives contracts is, in its details, more
complex than the outline given above, though these details are unnecessary for the argument of
this essay. For an example of some of these complexities, see Stephen J. Lubben, Derivatives and
Bankruptcy: The Flawed Case for Special Treatment, 12 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 61 (2009). The account
given above is based upon the author's personal involvement with the origins and development of
the derivatives market in the 1980s.
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The ethic of technical compliance thrives in a world where truth
and falsity are conceived as binary because it tolerates a zone of dis-
sembling appearance in which truth may be arbitraged. The difficult reg-
ulatory challenge is to design a regime in which we can again, like the
ancient Greeks, properly label such behavior as "false."
The foregoing discussion has shown that the ethic of technical com-
pliance may have a respected pedigree. But beyond these theoretical
stances toward a text, and observations about how our usage of terms
may facilitate operation of the ethic, why might someone believe that an
aggressive stance toward the law is moral?
X. SYSTEMS AND BY-PRODUCTS
The idea that technical compliance might constitute a moral stance
may strike some as an odd and counterintuitive account of our moral
experience. For those who have a Kantian view of morality, it is an
essential component that morality involves an internal conflict between
a desire and a duty. The moral actor functions as a private legislature in
which he constructs rules of reason for himself in the form of a categori-
cal imperative, which describes a duty. The moral actor follows the call
of duty developed via construction of the categorical imperative in
accordance with reason. The categorical imperative is structured in the
form of an injunction that might be universalized to apply to all actors.
Unless the action required by the duty might rationally be recommended
as a course of action for all actors, it is in the wrong form. This view of
morality would seem to rule out dissembling behavior that allows a
financial actor to take advantage of another.' 1 4
We ascribe praise or blame to an action in accord with whether the
act is taken in accord with the duty. Praise or blame is appropriate
because the actor is free to take either course-the moral actor is not
constrained by nature to follow desire in the sense that an animal with-
out reason follows desire. The moral actor has a choice because both
desire (operating in the physical world of cause and effect) and reason
(through an exercise of free will) may influence behavior. We praise the
actor who follows reason. This account of morality harmonizes our sci-
entific intuition that the world is ordered by the mechanical and external
rules of cause and effect with our moral intuition that we have free will
that may function as an internal cause of action outside physical laws.'
One answer to the Kantian account of our moral experience lies in
the structure of systems that produce beneficial by-products.11 6 Three
114. For an explanation of Kantian morality see PoimAN & FIESER, supra note 55, at 123-40.
115. Id.
116. This phenomenon is widely discussed in philosophical literature, notably by Jon Elster.
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examples illustrate the point. First, in a capitalist system it is an article
of faith that the good of society (we might say "truth" in a market) is
fostered by the pursuit of self-interest by buyers and sellers. Individual
buyers and sellers do not aim at producing wealth for society-they aim
at producing wealth for themselves. Yet, the by-product of this pursuit is
an efficient market in which all members of society benefit. Second, we
expect that our adversarial judicial system of plaintiffs and defendants is
well-suited to producing a form of juridical truth. The plaintiffs and
defendants aggressively pursue their own self-interest within the con-
fines of specified procedures, and the "truth" emerges (we might say
"truth" in the courtroom). Third, in the political realm we expect that the
competition of ideas fostered by a robust right to free speech will pro-
duce a government conducive to human flourishing-a form of political
truth (we might say "truth" in politics). Only in the third case can it
fairly be said that the individuals operating in the system truly believe
that they are, in any sense, advocating for the public good or truth in the
particular area of society involved. In cases one and two, the participants
would have to admit they are not individually pursuing truth but that
truth emerges from a process in which the aims of the participants are
quite different. These thoughts are captured most famously by Adam
Smith:
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the
baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own
self-interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their
self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their
advantages.
He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest,
nor knows how much he is promoting it. . . . [H]e intends only his
own gain, and he is in this, and in many other cases, led by an invisi-
ble hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. . . .By
pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of society more
effectually than when he really intends to promote it.117
In a society that places faith in structures in which the aim of indi-
vidual actors diverges from the desired by-product, it is understandable
for individuals to assume that this structure operates widely in social
life. The problem, however, is that in systems of disclosure and market
regulation, it is hard to identify the social utility that emerges as a by-
JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 43 (1985). A good
synopsis appears in Slavoj Zizek, Why is Kant Worth Fighting For?, Foreword to ALENKA
ZUPANIt, ETHICS OF THE REAL, at ix-xi. (2000). See also ROBERT NoziCK, SOCRATIC PUZZLES
191-97 (1997).
117. ADAM SMrrH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
22 (1776).
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product from individual practices that restrict disclosure or skirt market
restrictions via application of the ethic of technical compliance. At least,
at first blush, any reasons that might be given seem thin-what rationale
might one give for limiting information in a system of disclosure? The
only justification that suggests itself to me is some notion that providing
too much disclosure creates a form of information overload-the dis-
closing party must self-edit by including only relevant information in
order to make the information useable by the market.
A by-product stance toward moral behavior neatly reconciles path-
ological tendencies with the moral act because it eliminates the conflict
between desire and a rule opposed to desire. An internal conflict results
within an actor when a desire (such as creating private wealth) conflicts
with a moral rule adopted by an actor (such as a prohibition against
taking advantage of loopholes in the positive law out of a perceived duty
to community). In a system that produces beneficial by-products, the
actor makes the moral choice precisely by following his desire because
following the desire is the mechanism through which benefit to the com-
munity is created. An executive at Goldman Sachs can assert that his
firm is "doing God's work" because he has faith in the ability of the
pursuit of self-interest to produce social welfare as a by-product. In a
sense, this situation produces an excess of enjoyment for the technical
complier-he gets the satisfaction of pursuing his desire, and gets the
further satisfaction of knowing that he is helping society while doing so.
There are, however, well-known theoretical objections to the idea
that an aggressive stance towards disclosure rules will create social
value in the form of by-products. Indeed, economic theory suggests the
opposite.118
John von Neuman's work on game theory and its applications to
multiperson games in economic settings provide theoretical support for
Adam Smith's insight about invisible-hand explanations."' However,
they also expose its limitations. Kenneth Arrow and Gerald Debreu
showed that in non-zero sum games an equilibrium can develop in
which no player may increase his profit by changing strategy (analogous
to a weak Pareto optimum). 120 In a rigorous mathematical model, the
invisible hand produces a stable economic equilibrium acceptable to all
players.
The problem with this result is that it applies under general condi-
118. In this discussion of economic theory, I follow LASZL6 MRO, MORAL CALCULATIONS:
GAME THEORY, LOGIC, AND HUMAN FRAILTY 135-49 (David Kramer ed., Anna C. Gosi Greguss
trans., 1998).
119. Id. at 141-42.
120. Id.
422 [Vol. 66:393
THE ARBITRAGE OF TRUTH
tions that occur in a perfect market-conditions that do not obtain in any
real economy. One assumption of a perfect market is complete or perfect
information. Government intervention in the form of regulation aims to
nudge our imperfect economy towards the ideal of the perfect market,
and this is the very reason for rules that mandate disclosure. Actions by
the technical compliers that limit disclosure destroy the very conditions
thought necessary to produce the beneficial by-product.
To be sure, there are reasons to believe that the perfect market is an
impossible and incoherent fantasy, and that all attempts to achieve an
approximation of that ideal to improve social welfare are doomed to
fail.12 1 For present purposes, however, we may put these objections
aside. The important point is that we have made political decisions on
the generally accepted faith that government may adopt regulations that
achieve these beneficial results.122 The technical compliers forget this
fact when their competitive drive leads them to structure transactions
that conceal capital raising activities. The truly reflective technical com-
plier should thus steer clear of dissembling disclosure and take no com-
fort that he will produce beneficial by-products through sharp practice
when it comes to disclosure and market transparency.
To understand Wall Street, one must understand that a large per-
centage of the profits come from exploiting information asymmetries.
Indeed, arbitrage activities rely on an imperfect market for information.
Not all information asymmetries are sinister. While current SEC rules
prohibit use of inside information to trade securitiesl 23 (a "bad" informa-
tion asymmetry), market research and analysis to identify promising
investments is seen as a reward for engaging in the expensive task of
information gathering (a "good" information asymmetry). In the case of
private investment opportunities, an investment bank may seek out
information that is not available to the public and use this information to
its advantage (and the advantage of its clients). In the case of public
companies, U.S. regulations operate on the assumption that all basic
material information has been filed with the SEC and is publicly availa-
ble. In this case, the private information derives from analysis of public
121. See William H. Widen, Spectres of Law and Economics, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1423 (2004)
(book review).
122. The economists Samuelson and Nordhaus support the idea that government may take
steps to improve the market in socially beneficial ways. MtRO, supra note 118, at 142 ("When the
checks and balances of Darwinian perfect competition are absent, when economic activity spills
over outside of markets, when incomes are distributed in politically unacceptable ways, when
people's demands do not reflect their needs-when any of these conditions arises, then the
economy is not led by an invisible hand to an optimum position. Further, when a breakdown
occurs, the carefully designed and restrained intervention of government may improve economic
performance on this imperfect and interdependent globe.").
123. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2006).
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information-in theory, anyone could do the analysis; the investment
bank is rewarded for doing the analysis faster and better than the compe-
tition and selling the work product in the form of research reports to its
clients (compensation coming in the form of brokerage commissions and
trading for its own account)."'
Beyond a penchant for secrecy with respect to information about
companies, Wall Street is not a big fan of transparent pricing for its own
services. 12 5 These facts suggest that, while we might hope through edu-
cation to develop a class of enlightened technical compliers who do not
game the disclosure system, we must allow that the very fact of competi-
tion will incentivize bankers to market products that conceal financial
transactions. Indeed, short-sighted greed may trump the sort of long-
term greedy self-interest that would seek to preserve and improve the
market. If we take this somewhat cynical (though, I would suggest, prac-
tical) view, we must think carefully about how to play the game of tech-
nical compliance by drafting laws that counteract its pernicious impact.
This leads directly to the debate over a technical rules approach as con-
trasted with a general principles approach to drafting.
XI. RULES VERSUS PRINCIPLES
A practical answer to an ethic that refuses to look beyond the text
of the law is to insert the desired content into the text. This insertion can
take one of two forms. The first approach-which could be called the
"rules approach"-would draft increasingly comprehensive and com-
plex legislation in an attempt to cover all relevant situations within the
text of the law. However, the problem with attempting to be comprehen-
sive with the use of detail is well-known and relates to the problem of
contracting. It is often said that all contracts are "incomplete" in that
they cannot cover all contingencies. This leaves open spaces in any
negotiated agreement that must be completed by the gap-fillers of the
law-often left to the discretion of a judge. Further, the more detail
included in the contract, the higher the transaction costs of negotiation,
drafting, interpretation, and monitoring the agreement. The same might
be said of legislation. Is it possible for a rule-maker to anticipate all the
contingencies and creative structures that Wall Street and the financial
engineers might create?
At the other end of the spectrum-the second so-called "standards"
or "principles approach"-the rule-maker drafts legislation in general
terms. This approach requires the person confronted with the law to
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engage in some form of evaluation to decide whether particular conduct
is prohibited. This may result in the person looking for the "intent"
behind the general language or to some other system of beliefs to discern
the scope of the legislation.
This approach to drafting legislation may be criticized on at least
two grounds: it gives wide discretion to regulators and judges to inter-
pret the law, and it may fail to signal adequately the scope of the law to
those subject to it. One perceived requirement of law is that it be public
and knowable so that people may conform their conduct to it. Clarity of
scope allows the law to teach the public what conduct is required. This
function is hampered by vague and general laws.
In the principles versus rules debate over the correct approach to
drafting legislation, Executive Order 12988, signed by President Clin-
ton, provides a good place to start. This Order contains a helpful
roadmap for legislators by outlining a number of areas that good legisla-
tion should explicitly address in order to reduce the burden of litigation
in the federal courts. It makes little sense to draft legislation that does
not address matters such as the applicability of a statute of limitations,
the existence of a private right of action, the types of remedies that may
be sought, and whether attorney's fees might be awarded to the prevail-
ing party. 12 6
Most of the Order addresses concerns such as these which might
broadly be characterized as procedural in nature. These are matters for
which clear and detailed rules (as opposed to general principles) make
sense. As a signature example, courts should not be burdened with
deciding whether a statute implies a private right of action when atten-
tive drafting could answer the question definitively.
The Order, however, appears to side with the rules approach, rather
than the principles approach, when it addresses the standard for pro-
scribed conduct by contrasting a "clear legal standard" with "a general
126. Exec. Order No. 12,988, 61 Fed. Reg. 4729 (Feb. 5, 1996), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519
(2006). The Order directs agencies to make every reasonable effort to ensure that proposed
legislation, "as appropriate . . . specifies in clear language"-(A) whether causes of action arising
under the law are subject to statutes of limitations; (B) the preemptive effect; (C) the effect on
existing Federal law; (D) a clear legal standard for affected conduct; (E) whether arbitration and
other forms of dispute resolution are appropriate; (F) whether the provisions of the law are
severable if one or more is held unconstitutional; (G) the retroactive effect, if any; (H) the
applicable burdens of proof; (1) whether private parties are granted a right to sue, and, if so, what
relief is available and whether attorney's fees are available; (J) whether state courts have
jurisdiction and "under what conditions an action would be removable to Federal court;" (K)
whether administrative remedies must be pursued prior to initiating court actions; (L) standards
governing personal jurisdiction; (M) definitions of key statutory terms; (N) applicability to the
Federal Government; (0) applicability to states, territories, the District of Columbia, and the
Commonwealths of Puerto Rico and the Northern Mariana Islands; and (P) what remedies are
available, "such as money damages, civil penalties, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees." Id.
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standard."1 27
The agency's proposed legislation and regulations shall provide a
clear legal standard for affected conduct rather than a general stan-
dard, and shall promote simplification and burden reduction.128
Nevertheless, a vague or general law that creates a "grey area" may have
a beneficial effect on behavior even if it fails its precise signaling or
educational function because it may engender a cautionary stance
towards the law and compliance. Justice Brandeis famously noted the
role that ambiguity may play in systems of rules:
I have been asked many times in regard to particular practices or
agreements as to whether they were legal or illegal . . . . One gentle-
men said to me, '[w]e do not know where we can go.' To which I
replied, 'I think your lawyers or anyone else can tell you where a
fairly safe course lies. If you are walking along a precipice no human
being can tell you how near you can go to that precipice without
falling over, because you may stumble on a loose stone, you may slip
and go over; but anybody can tell you where you can walk perfectly
safe within convenient distance of that precipice.' The difficulty
which men have felt ... has been rather that they have wanted to go
the limit rather than that they have wanted to go safely.129
Though Justice Brandeis correctly identifies the problem, he does
not expand upon the likely source of this risky behavior. In a capitalist
system the competitive structure of the market incentivizes men to "go
to the limit" because a failure to do so places them at a disadvantage
with respect to their peers. A certain pathology (in a Kantian sense)
compels this result. Absent the possibility of meaningful sanctions to
enter into this calculus of pathology, we should expect no other outcome
unless business morality contains an ethical component beyond a utilita-
rian calculus of desire. The present state of the financial markets does
not seem to justify such an optimistic stance towards the attitude of busi-
ness. The Clinton edict to eschew general standards for proscribed con-
duct may in fact encourage, rather than discourage, risky behavior with
respect to legal compliance.
A few conditions lead to conduct that crosses the line-counteract-
ing the "grey area" effect identified by Justice Brandeis. First, regulators
will only uncover a fraction of prohibited conduct. Second, in most
cases the penalty for violation of the law will simply result in disgorge-
ment of the benefit received as a result of the violation. Third, the viola-
127. See id. § 3(a)(3).
128. Id.
129. Control of Corporations, Persons, and Firms Engaged in Interstate Commerce: Hearing
on S. Res. 98 Before the S. Comm. On Interstate Commerce 62d Cong. 1161 (1911) (statement of
Louis D. Brandeis).
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tion will not result in jail time for individuals who perpetrated the
scheme because of scienter requirements for imposition of criminal lia-
bility. Detailed rules make it easier to invoke technical compliance as
part of an attempt to defeat scienter. This is a recipe for under-
deterrence.
Simply following a principles approach does not appear to be a
panacea either. A close look at case law dealing with accounting rules
suggests that, under existing law, accountants should already follow a
principles-based, rather than a technical rules-based, approach when it
comes to preparation of financial statements.o13 This creates some con-
cern that merely drafting principles will prove insufficient to counter the
problem if the use of principles is not intelligently implemented. Leh-
man Brothers' use of the Repo 105 transaction illustrates this problem.
XI. LEHMAN BROTHERS, REPO 105 TRANSACTIONS AND PRINCIPLES
Strict adherence to bright-line rules seems to have influenced Leh-
man Brothers' use of the Repo 105 transactions. Lehman Brothers took
the position that the use of these transactions was not technically ille-
gal."' Nevertheless, the transactions masked the reality of the firm's
financial position by allowing Lehman to report a lower leverage ratio.
The Repo 105 transactions are an accounting treatment that allowed
Lehman Brothers to temporarily remove billions of dollars from its bal-
ance sheet by using repurchase agreements.132
A repurchase agreement is a short-term financing transaction in
which a borrower "sells" collateral to a lender and promises to repur-
chase it later.13 3 Financial statements normally report repurchase agree-
ments as liabilities of the borrower. The Repo 105 transaction allows the
borrow to characterize its financing as a sale if the assets transferred
have a value of 105% or more of the financing amount. 13 This transac-
tion structure allowed Lehman Brothers to reduce its balance sheet by
130. See generally, United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 807-09 (2d Cir. 1969) (examining
the acts of the accountants who did not financially benefit from fraud but nevertheless committed
fraud); see also Ronald M. Mano et al., Principles-Based Accounting: It's Not New, It's Not the
Rules, It's the Law, The CPA J. (Feb. 2006), http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajoumal/2006/206/
essentials/p60.htm.
131. See Efrati & Jones, supra note 10.
132. See Valukas, supra note 3, at 6 ("Lehman ... had been using an accounting device ... to
manage its balance sheet-by temporarily removing approximately $50 billion of assets . . . .").
133. See Michael J. Fleming & Kenneth D. Garbade, The Repurchase Agreement Refined:
GCF Repo, CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE (June 2003), http://www.newyorkfed.
org/research/currentjissues/ci9-6.pdf ("A repurchase agreement is a sale of securities coupled
with an agreement to repurchase the same securities at a higher price on a later date.").
134. See Valukas, supra note 3, at 6 ("[B]ecause the assets were 105% or more of the cash
received, accounting rules permitted the transactions to be treated as sales. . - .").
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eliminating assets while using the proceeds to repay short-term debt. 3 1
Lehman Brothers closed the transactions just prior to the end of a finan-
cial reporting period and reversed the transaction after the close of the
reporting period by repurchasing the assets.13 6 Lehman Brothers availed
itself of a loophole in the Financial Accounting Standards Board's State-
ment ("FAS") 140, passed in September 2000, "Accounting for Trans-
fers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of
Liabilities," which contained the 105% threshold for sale treatment
(rather than debt treatment).' 3 ' FAS 140 updated FAS 125, passed in
1996, which attempted to codify accounting for repurchase
agreements. 138
In addition to thoughtful drafting of general rules that prohibit con-
duct, consideration must be given to specifying monetary damages that
exceed the profit obtained from the illegal conduct-such as the treble
damages imposed for certain antitrust violations-to counteract the
under-detection problem.13 9 Second, consideration must be given to
eliminating a scienter requirement for violations of financial regulation.
I have previously argued that in the special case of margin regulations
Congress has already taken this step.'o If there is any area of law in
which the participants might be expected to have extensive legal advice
concerning the scope of regulation, it would be in the financial services
industry, making it an appropriate area to stand by the maxim that igno-
rance of the law is no defense. With these steps in place, intelligently
drafted general rules might have a chance of introducing some muscle
behind Justice Cardozo's observation about the potential benefits of
ambiguity which general rules might provide.
To see what kinds of general rules that proscribe conduct might get
Wall Street's attention, one need look no farther than recent case law.
135. Id.
136. See Valukas, supra note 3, at 7 ("Lehman used Repo 105 for no articulated business
purpose except 'to reduce balance sheet at the quarter-end.').
137. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.
140, at 4 (Sept. 2000).
138. Id.
139. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, Optimal Sanctions When the Probability of
Apprehension Varies Among Individuals (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 4078,
1992) for a general discussion of the problem of under deterrence and its attendant complexities.
See generally, Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. EcON.
169 (1968); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1193 (1985).
140. See Widen, Enron at the Margin, supra note 8, at 970 n.46. My observation has been
misunderstood as applying to securities laws more generally.
[Vol. 66:393428
THE ARBITRAGE OF TRUTH
XIII. EXAMPLES OF LAWS AND RULES THAT FIGHT BACK
A recent decision illustrates how parties attempt to treat a swap as a
genus that exempts them from regulation.' 4' It also showed how a
judge's application of a general provision sent shock waves of the
desired sort into the derivatives market.142 Another ongoing case, also
involving derivatives, shows the extent to which defendants will make
technical arguments to limit language that would clearly seem to have
been designed with a broad reach to cover the transaction at issue. 13
XIV. COUNTERACTING THE ETHIC OF TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE-A
MODEL RESPONSE TO THE GREEK DEBT CRISIS
To counter the systemic incentives to "go to the limit," a simple
standards or principles strategy may prove ineffective. We must, there-
fore, consider steps to make such an approach robust. For maximum
effect, a robust standards approach should not limit itself simply to using
general terms. In some legal settings, a set of rules includes express
principles of interpretation that direct focus beyond the words expres-
sing the rules. One example appears in the UCC, which adopts a hierar-
chy of principles that directs reference to usage of trade, course of
dealing, and course of performance to interpret terms in fully integrated
agreements."' The effect is to admit extrinsic evidence to interpret con-
tracts, confirming that interpretation will never be limited to an exami-
nation of the mere four corners of a document. Another example appears
in the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods ("CISG"), which similarly refers to trade usage and dealings
between the parties, but also refers to promotion of global uniformity in
interpretation-implicitly directing courts in one jurisdiction to look to
decisions in other jurisdictions for guidance. 14 5 One also finds an
attempt to include legislative intent into the text of law in Australia.
Amendments to the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 provide that statements
made in the Second Reading speech by Ministers introducing an Act
may be used in the interpretation of that act.146
141. CSX Corp. v. Children's Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.N.Y.
2008), affd in part, vacated in part, 2011 WL 2750913292 (2d Cir. July 18, 2011).
142. Id. at 517.
143. SEC v. Rorech, 673 F. Supp. 2d 217, 225-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (rejecting a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim).
144. See U.C.C. § 1-303 (2011).
145. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, opened for
signature Apr. I1, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9 (1983), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan.
1, 1988). Article 7 of the CISG requires that it be interpreted with the goal of international
uniformity. Id.
146. See Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth.) s. 15AB. In the English tradition, proper practice
did not allow courts to look at legislative pronouncements for the interpretation of acts of
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In the context of the Greek debt crisis, how might regulators have
used a robust standards approach? First, instead of mandating disclosure
of "debt" and using other category words that may have an ossified
meaning, the rules might have used a term with broader reach-for
example, by requiring disclosure of "financial obligations"-the classic
"standards" approach. Second, the rules might have included a principle
of interpretation in the rules themselves that make reference to the func-
tional equivalent of debt by requiring that the law be construed to pro-
mote disclosure. For example,
These rules shall be liberally interpreted to promote disclosure of all
financial obligations of the Member States (including its instrumen-
talities and agencies) with the purpose of providing a complete and
accurate picture of the financial capacity of the Member States to
honor financial commitments of any kind. Accordingly, the term
"financial obligation" shall include, without limitation, an obligation
denominated as a debt, a loan, a mortgage, a security, a sale, a sale-
leaseback, a lease, a derivative, a securitization, a pre-export financ-
ing or other anticipation of revenue, or otherwise, and whether or not
liquidated or unliquidated, certain or contingent, recourse or non-
recourse, or structured directly by a Member State, one of its instru-
mentalities or agencies or through a special purpose or other financ-
ing vehicle.
For practical purposes, such a definition should be coupled with a proce-
dure, similar to the no-action letter process used by the SEC, pursuant to
which a would-be transaction participant might describe a transaction to
the regulator and obtain advice as to whether or not a particular transac-
tion would be covered by the above definition. If these no-action letters
were published, they would, over time, form a supplemental text to
which reference could be made to interpret the text of the rules.
Third, a robust standards approach could also benefit from a re-
thinking of the very concept of financial obligation by not attempting to
rely solely on category words such as "debt" or "financial obligation" to
delimit the category of transactions that require disclosure. Words such
as these attempt to describe a resulting structure, leaving open the possi-
bility that an alternate structure will emerge for which the existing cate-
gory words are inadequate. This is exactly what happened when, in the
early 1980s, Wall Street developed the "derivatives" transaction-a pre-
viously unknown legal form. Instead, the robust standards approach
Parliament-in contrast to acceptable practice in the United States, Australia, and New Zealand.
When practice began to change in English courts, this caused concern. See Scott C. Styles, The
Rule of Parliament: Statutory Interpretation After Pepper v. Hart, 14 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
151, 157 (1994).
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might include a supplemental disclosure requirement that focuses on the
origin of financial innovation and problematic structures. For example,
Any capital raising transaction, if consummated, in which a Member
State or any of its instrumentalities or agencies has consulted,
engaged or hired, directly or indirectly, a commercial banker, an
investment banker, a financial advisor, an underwriter, a placement
agent, a consultant, or similar financial professional shall be pre-
sumed to result in the creation of a financial obligation which
requires disclosure pursuant to these rules. The foregoing shall apply
even if the financial professional purports to act as a principal and not
as an agent or advisor.
The motivation for such a novel re-definition of financial obligation
might be traced to Hume's reflections on causation.14 7 Whenever a
transaction is criticized as being the product of financial engineering cre-
ated in the spirit of the ethic of technical compliance-from Enron to
Greek debt-Wall Street seems lurking in the background. Wall Street
appears first, followed by a scandal involving a fancy structure that ena-
bled a non-disclosure by stipulating that all creations emanating from
this source constitute "financial obligations" that require disclosure, a
system of rules would migrate away from a focus on the intricacies of
structure itself and instead focus on the apparent "cause" of these struc-
tures. (We need not assume that there is some hidden necessary connec-
tion; we need only note that the two are conjoined in our experience.)
After all, Wall Street is in the business of raising capital in various ways
and getting paid for it. These capital-raising activities all have the hall-
mark of generating funding for the client and require payment or repay-
ment because Wall Street is not running a charity.
My supplemental definition of "financial obligation" does not limit
itself to transactions in which the financial professional receives a fee,
but simply requires that the financial professional have been consulted
on the structure. To be sure, in most cases, the financial professional will
have charged a fee. However, we do not want to encourage a practice in
which financial professionals design complex structures "for free" and
then receive compensation indirectly, either by charging a higher rate to
facilitate garden-variety debt transactions or by purchasing assets at a
discount. (To further enhance the definition, one might consider whether
the concept of financial professional should be expanded expressly to
cover accountants and lawyers lest the locus of financial engineering
simply migrate.) Indeed, if the E.U. regulators want to elicit disclosure
of prior exotic transactions used by other countries, I would recommend
147. See generally Donald Davidson, Causal Relations, 64 J. Phil. 691-92 (1967) (noting that
cause and effect does not reflect a perceived necessary connection but simply the regular
occurrence of the effect following the occurrence of the cause).
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that they request a list of all transactions in which countries raised capi-
tal and engaged financial professionals. Such a definition might further
be strengthened by requiring disclosure of any financing structure in
which a third party received compensation in excess of a threshold
amount. Follow the money, and you will find the transactions.' 48
XV. CONCLUSIONS
What is the theoretical status of my practical suggestions for com-
batting the ethic of technical compliance? Significantly, the strategy
seems to involve the regulator in a mere war of words in which decon-
struction of laws by business interests is countered by simply suggesting
a better choice of words.
This explains the desire to improve regulatory schemes by, for
example, revising the text of rules using the robust standards approach
outlined above-particularly the use of general terms and the inclusion
of principles of interpretation in the text of the rule or regulation. It also
explains, to an extent, my third recommendation to rethink a definition
of "financial obligation" to focus on origins rather than structure. How-
ever, this third recommendation has a broader purpose.
The Heideggerian insight that our modem conception of truth
allows for a dissembling appearance to count as truth (or, at least, not
falsehood) suggests an antidote for the ethic of technical compliance. In
essence, the approach gives up on any attempt to provide a complete
algorithm for separating those financing structures that should be dis-
closed from those financing structures that need not be disclosed. Rec-
ognizing that the financial professionals are engaged in the generic
business of raising capital and that these almost certainly create repay-
ment obligations of some sort (or deplete assets in the form of sale trans-
actions), the rule simply designates for disclosure all structures which
emanate from financial professionals-abandoning a classification
scheme for transactions. To be sure, this involves a linguistic move of
sorts because one must now define the scope of the term "financial pro-
fessional" in order to fully understand the scope of the term "financial
obligation." I submit, however, that this task is a far easier one than
148. There is an extensive literature considering the problem of corporate compliance and how
to design efficient systems and rules that promote compliance with law. See, e.g. Kimberly D.
Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U.L.Q. 487
(2003) (discussing shortcomings of internal compliance programs, with citations to the literature).
The position advocated for in this essay recommends drafting techniques that make it harder to
game the system of legal rules. To be sure, this may push actors from the technical compliance
camp to the intentional violation camp. It is assumed, however, that this is a step some actors may
be unwilling to take. That is to say, an action will not be taken if it is more difficult to argue that
the action technically complies with law.
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attempting to catalog an ever expanding menagerie of financial prod-
ucts.14 9 Indeed, if we give up on classifying the animals in the zoo, it
may focus financial innovation in directions that do not "create" value
for clients by manufacturing dissembling disclosure. The definition, if
successful, removes profit from the arbitrage of truth.
I have suggested that we can understand the ethic of technical com-
pliance by observing that moral knowledge has become sentential in the
spheres in which the ethic operates. A consequence of this development
is that business ethics will remain pathological-without resort to moral
principles beyond the correspondence between outward acts and a text
of rules and regulations. The competition inherent in our economic sys-
tem ensures that the businessmen will approach the limits-walking
dangerously close to the edge of the cliff in Justice Brandeis' meta-
phor tso-to avoid placing themselves at disadvantage. This situation is
unlikely to ever foster disclosure of the sort thought proper by regulators
and the public. The solution to this problem requires elimination of the
space in which truth may be arbitraged by eliminating the potentially
hopeless task of classification of financial transactions into the dis-
closable and the private. In closing, I note that various interpretivist the-
ories of law, explored by Ronald Dworkin and others, use a coherence,
rather than a correspondence, model of truth to examine and critique
legal practices."' Examining the ethic of technical compliance in light
of coherence models of truth might be a worthwhile exercise, but such a
project is beyond the scope of this essay.
149. One practical way to close the definitional loop might be to create a list of permitted
financial professionals. Member States would commit to using only financial professionals
included on the list. Capital-raising transactions with those on the list would require disclosure.
Financial transactions with those not on the list would be void transactions (and not simply
voidable transactions). To foster competition, admission to the list could be a simple matter of
voluntary registration. Criminal sanctions might apply both to government officials and financial
professionals who promote and execute transactions with unlisted firms.
150. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g. Ken Kress, Why No Judge Should Be a Dworkinian Coherentist, 77 TEX. L. REv.
1375 (1999) (examining the core role that coherence theories of truth play in the theories of
Ronald Dworkin).
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